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1. Plaintiff is the prior user of the trade name, service mark or trade mark (collectively, “trade symbol”);
2. Plaintiff’s trade symbol is arbitrary or suggestive or has acquired secondary meaning;
3. Defendant is using a confusingly similar trade symbol to identify a similar good marketed or services rendered in competition with the plaintiff in the same area of the plaintiff’s established trade symbol; and
4. Defendant’s actions will likely cause consumer confusion as to the sponsorship of the good or service.

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1. Plaintiff is the prior user of the trade name, service mark or trade mark (collectively, “trade symbol”);
2. Plaintiff’s trade symbol is arbitrary or suggestive or has acquired secondary meaning;
3. Defendant is using a confusingly similar trade symbol to identify a similar good marketed or services rendered in competition with the plaintiff in the same area of the plaintiff’s established trade symbol; and
4. Defendant’s actions will likely cause consumer confusion as to the sponsorship of the good or service.

The following claims share identical elements: (a) common law trade name, service mark and trade mark infringement; (b) common law unfair competition; and (c) Lanham Act trade name, service mark and trade mark infringement. See American United Life Ins. Co. v. American United Ins. Co., 731 F. Supp. 480, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1990). A “trade name” describes an entity or person, and applies to a business and its good will. A “service mark” describes the services provided by an entity or person and a “trade mark” reflects marketable goods. See Blanding Auto. Ctr., Inc. v. Blanding Auto., Inc., 568 So.2d 490, 492 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

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FLORIDA STATE COURTS

Supreme Court: Junior Food Stores of W. Fla., Inc. v. Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 226 So. 2d 393, 397 (Fla. 1969).

Fifth District: Tortoise Island Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Tortoise Island Realty, Inc., 790 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

FLORIDA FEDERAL COURTS

Eleventh Circuit: Engineered Tax Servs., Inc. v. Scarpello Consulting, Inc., 958 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2020); Phoenix Entm’t Partners, LLC v. Casey Rd. Food & Beverage, LLC, 728 F. App’x. 910, 912 (11th Cir. 2018).

Southern District: Marketing Partner Serv., LLC v. Sciortino, No. 0:24-CV-61567-WPD, 2024 WL 5681467, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2024)Chanel, Inc. v. Individuals, 2023 WL 2540439, *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2023); JHO Intell. Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Ignite Int’l, Ltd., 2022 WL 1486888, *6-12 (S.D. Fla. May 10, 2022); XYZ Corp. v. Individuals, 2022 WL 1125790, *2-3 (S.D. Fla. April 15, 2022).

Middle District: PRN Health Servs. LLC v. Nurses PRN of Fla., LLC, 2022 WL 4072064, *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2022); Ain Jeem, Inc. v. Individuals, 2022 WL 1508911, *5-6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2022); Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. v. Montgomery L. Firm, LLC, No. 8:19-CV-1895-T-36CPT, 2020 WL 2128498, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2020); LLW Enter., LLC v. Ryan, No. 8:19-CV-1641-T-35AAS, 2020 WL 2630859, at *8 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2020).

FLORIDA STATUTES

‘ 495.151, Fla. Stat.

FEDERAL STATUTES

15 U.S.C. ” 1114, 1125 (Lanham Act)

REFERENCES

Restatement of Unfair Competition ‘ 20 (1993)

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2 Defenses to Claim for Unfair Competition

(1) Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) (pleading affirmative defenses), and other standard defenses. See § 1.

(2) Statute of Limitations: § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (four years); see Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).

(3) Consent: like acquiescence, consent is defense where the licensor has expressly or impliedly consented to the infringement. See Isaly Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 983, 995 (M.D. Fla. 1985); Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 29 (1995).

(4) Abandonment: a defendant may raise the defense of abandonment when the plaintiff had previously abandoned the mark prior to making infringement claims against the defendant. See Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1546 (11th Cir. 1986); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 30 (1995).

(5) Unreasonable Delay (Laches): inexcusable delay in bringing an action for infringement that results in prejudice to the defendant may serve to bar, in whole or in part, the plaintiff’s infringement claim. See Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1546 (11th Cir. 1986); Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 31 (1995).

(6) Plaintiff’s Misconduct (Unclean Hands): plaintiffs who seek a remedy in equity with “unclean hands,” which does not require the commission of a crime but only acts “condemned by honest and reasonable” persons, will be denied relief. See Roberts v. Roberts, 84 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1956); see also Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing unclean hands defense in trademark cases); Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 32 (1995).

(7) Lanham Act (see 15 U.S.C. § 1115) defenses for incontestable trademarks: (a) mark was fraudulently obtained; (b) abandonment; (c) permission; (d) use is self-descriptive and in good faith; (e) adoption without knowledge of prior registration and continued use without objection; (f) prior registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1062, (g) mark is being used to violate antitrust laws; and (h) equitable defenses. See In re Tampa Checkmate Food Services, Inc., 221 B.R. 541, 547 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (statutorily enumerated defenses are not exclusive, and defendant may raise other defenses).

(8) Plaintiff’s failure to initiate litigation against every potential and actual infringer does not, without more, diminish the strength of the plaintiff’s mark. See Breakers of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Int’l Beach Hotel Dev., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 1576, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1993).

(9) Protection is not available to generic marks that provide only information about the nature or class of service. See Breakers of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Int’l Beach Hotel Dev., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 1576, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1993).

(10) Acquiescence is an equitable defense available when the licensor has expressly or impliedly consented the infringement. See Isaly Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 983, 995 (M.D. Fla. 1985).

(11) Estoppel. See Four Seasons Hotel and Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1329-30 (S.D.Fla. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 138 F. App’x. 297 (11th Cir. 2005) (Table, No. 03-16189).

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