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A defendant’s oral (slander) or written (libel) publication of a statement to a third party that, when considered alone, without innuendo:

1. Tends to subject persons to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace;
2. Tends to injure a person in a trade or profession; or
3. Attributes to a person either conduct, characteristics, or conditions incompatible with the proper exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession or office.

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A defendant’s oral (slander) or written (libel) publication of a statement to a third party that, when considered alone, without innuendo:

1. Tends to subject persons to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace;
2. Tends to injure a person in a trade or profession; or
3. Attributes to a person either conduct, characteristics, or conditions incompatible with the proper exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession or office.

In slander per se actions, the defamatory statement is actionable on its face and damages are presumed. Slander per quod requires additional explanation to prove the defamation and damages. See, e.g., Hood v. Conners, 419 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). A defamation per se claim against a media defendant requires a showing of actual malice. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334, 347-349 (1974).

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FLORIDA STATE COURTS

First District: Axelrod v. Califano, 357 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

Second District: Bass v. Rivera, 826 So.2d 534, 534 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002).

Third District: Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376, 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), aff’d, 458 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984).

Fourth District: Tilton v. Wrobel, 198 So.3d 909, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Blake v. Giustibelli, 182 So. 3d 881, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

Fifth District: Hoch v. Rissman, Weisberg, Barrett, Hurt, Donahue, & McLain, P.A., 742 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

FLORIDA FEDERAL COURTS

Eleventh Circuit: Alan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 604 Fed.Appx. 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2015).

Southern District: Daly v. Markel Serv. Inc., No. 21-CV-62056, 2024 WL 4903776, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2024); Block v. Matesic, 2023 WL 3816693, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2023); Ludwin v. Proman, 2023 WL 2401774, *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2023); Saulsberry v. Elder, 2022 WL 17830489, *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2022).

Middle District: Loomer v. Maher, No. 5:24-CV-625-JSM-PRL, 2025 WL 756549, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2025); San Juan Prods., Inc. v. River Pools & Spas, Inc., 2023 WL 1994087, *8 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2023); Zimmerman v. Buttigieg, 2021 WL 6065781, *9 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2021); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. AFO Imaging, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-2419-VMC-CPT, 2021 WL 2825949, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2021).

Northern District: Black v. Advanced Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., No. 4:11cv539–WS., 2014 WL 1303656, at *7 (N.D. Fla. March 27, 2014).

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2 Defenses to Claim for Defamation Per Se

(1) Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) (pleading affirmative defenses), and other standard defenses. See § 1.

(2) Statute of Limitations: § 95.11(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (two years).

(3) Defamation slander is actionable per se without a showing of special damages if it imputes to another: a criminal offense amounting to a felony; a presently existing venereal or other loathsome and communicable disease; conduct, characteristics, or a condition incompatible with the proper exercise of his lawful business, trade, profession, or office; or the other being a woman, acts of unchastity. Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

(4) Defamation libel is actionable per se without a showing of special damages if it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; it charges a person with having an infectious disease; it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or it tends to injure one in his trade or profession. Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

(5) Truth is a complete defense to defamation claims. Rosenberg v. American Bowling Congress, 589 F. Supp. 547, 551 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Turner v. Wells, 198 F.Supp.3d 1355, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2016), aff’d,  879 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Art. I, § 4, Fla. Const..

(6) Statements made during a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged provided that such statements are related to the proceeding’s subject matter. Levin, Middlebrooks v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1994) (absolute privilege extends to parties, witnesses counsel and judges).

(7) Absolute privilege extends to statements made during labor grievance proceedings provided that such statements are related to the proceeding’s subject matter. See Hope v. Nat. Alliance, Jacksonville 320, 649 So. 2d 897, 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

(8) Public officials are entitled to absolute immunity for all statements made within the scope of the officer’s duties, regardless of how false or malicious or badly motivated the statements. Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1970); Quintero v. Diaz, 300 So.3d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).

(9) Qualified privilege protects defamatory statements made by private individuals to the police or the state’s attorney prior to the institution of criminal charges. Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992). However, the privilege can be overcome by establishing that the individual acted with express malice in making the defamatory statements. Id; see also Lozada v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 702 Fed.Appx. 904, 911 (11th Cir. 2017).

(10) “An employer who discloses information about a former employee’s job performance to a prospective employer of the former employee upon request of the prospective employer or of the former employee is presumed to be acting in good faith and, unless lack of good faith is shown by clear and convincing evidence, is immune from civil liability for such disclosure or its consequences. For purposes of this section, the presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a showing that the information disclosed by the former employer was knowingly false or deliberately misleading, was rendered with malicious purpose, or violated any civil right of the former employee protected under chapter 760.” Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 745 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); § 768.095, Fla. Stat.

(11) Statements of pure opinion based on known facts do not give rise to defamation claims. See Miami Child’s World, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 669 So. 2d 336, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Turner v. Wells, 198 F.Supp.3d 1355, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2016), aff’d,  879 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2018); Loomer v. Maher, No. 5:24-CV-625-JSM-PRL, 2025 WL 756549, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2025).

(12) Minor inconsistencies in news reports are not actionable provided that report is substantially true and inaccuracies did not result from deliberate falsification or awareness of probable falsity. Newton v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 447 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

(13) § 770.01, Fla. Stat., requires five (5) days notice to a defendant prior to filing a libel suit.

(14) Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute (Section 768.295, Fla. Stat.) protects the exercise of the right of “free speech in connection with public issues,” provides that “[i]t is the public policy of this state that a person or governmental entity not engage in SLAPP suits because such actions are inconsistent with the right of persons to exercise such constitutional rights of free speech in connection with public issues,” and affords “[a] person or entity sued by a governmental entity or another person in violation of this section has a right to an expeditious resolution of a claim that the suit is in violation of [Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute].” Section 768.295(1) and (4), Fla. Stat. See also WPB Residents for Integrity in Gov’t, Inc. v. Materio, 284 So.3d 555, 558-59 (Fla 4th DCA 2019); Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc., 264 So.3d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)(detailing the substantive and procedural aspects of Florida’s Anti-SLAPP Statute).

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